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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DILEMMA OF IMMIGRATION
Stranded within the disquieting paradox of immigration, the constitutional
right of an alien to seek asylum in this country remains a dilemma that strikes
at our core values.I As a nation descended predominantly from immigrants,
much that we represent as a people and the quality of life we enjoy today is
owed to ancestors who braved myriad perils to reach our shores from foreign
lands.2 And yet, that same standard of living that each of us owes to refugees
of the past is seemingly threatened by future immigrants who continue to flood
across United States borders each year.3 Therefore, deep-rooted ambivalence
reaches across public and legal policies that cannot reconcile our legacy of
compassion with present apprehensions about the massive consumption of fi-
nite resources that are professedly jeopardized by future immigrant multi-
tudes.4 This moral conflict is compounded by the enormous logistical chal-
t Co-Founder and Partner, Coffey, Diaz & O'Naghten, Miami, Florida. B.S., University of Florida;
J.D., University of Florida.
1. As one commentator described the emotional impact of immigration, "No war, no national crisis
has left a greater impress on the American psyche than the successive waves of new arrivals that quite
literally built the country." Bernard A. Weisberger, A Nation of Immigrants, AMERICAN HERITAGE
(Feb. - March, 1994) at 75.
2. Immigrants flooded to this country without restriction throughout much of our history. In 1790,
our population stood at four million and reached thirty-two million by 1860. Weisberger supra note 1, at
82. Immigrant waves continued after the Civil War with fourteen million arriving between 1860 and
1900 with another 18,600,000 following between 1900 and 1930. Id. at 83-84
3. As the Supreme Court established in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), illegal and undocu-
mented immigrant children are constitutionally entitled to a public education. Another source of public
concern has been the impact of immigration on taxpayer obligations for government entitlements. While
only a small fraction of immigrants are on welfare, their rate of 6.6 % is slightly higher than the 4.9 %
for Native Americans. That usage is concentrated among the elderly who comprise 28 % of welfare
benefits among immigrants. Michael Fix et al., The Use of SSI and Other Welfare Programs By Immi-
grants, Testimony Before the House Ways and Means Committee (May 23, 1996)
(http://www.urban.org/testimon/fix.htm).
4. The true economic impact of immigration is the subject of active debate. A report by the Urban
Institute has challenged the widespread assumption that immigrants represent an aggregate drain on so-
cietal resources. Michael Fix & Jeffrey S Passel, Immigration and Immigrants, Setting the Record
Straight, The Urban Institute (May 1994) (http://www.urban.org/pubs/immig/immig.htm).
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lenge in restricting immigration. Even hundred-mile walls have seen little suc-
cess throughout history. Certainly, our country's thousands of miles of land
and sea borders, along with undefinable access through the airways, eliminate
any realistic possibility of effective physical containment.
As a result of the dilemma that immigration presents to our national ethic
and the seemingly insurmountable obstacles that confront attempts at rigorous
enforcement, the fusion of self-conflict and futility may have dispelled any
sense that the challenge is truly solvable. 5 This equation of seeming intracta-
bility has deepened the already significant reluctance of the courts and the
Congress to displace executive responsibility. Indeed, rather than challenge ex-
ecutive management of these largely unmanageable problems, 6 the other
branches of government have typically avoided actions that might be seen as
undermining the efforts of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Yet,
while declining roles of activism in immigration matters, the judiciary, like the
Congress, has not awarded accolades to the INS.7 To the contrary, criticisms
This misperception regarding immigrants' net fiscal impact has been reinforced by several highly
publicized recent studies that overlook three basic facts about immigration. First, integration of immi-
grants is dynamic; their incomes and tax contributions both increase the longer they live in the United
States. Second, incomes vary considerably for different types of immigrants with legally admitted im-
migrants, as a group, generally having significantly higher incomes than illegal immigrants or refugees.
Finally, the studies do not take into account the indirect benefits of job creation from immigrant busi-
nesses or consumer demand.
The Urban Institute Report acknowledges, though, that a disproportionate impact may fall upon state
and local governments.
Contrary to the public's perception, when all levels of government are considered together, immi-
grants generate significantly more in taxes paid than they cost in services received. This surplus is un-
evenly distributed among different levels of government, however, with immigrants (and natives) gen-
erating a net surplus to the federal government, but a net cost to some states and most localities.
5. In a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee on June 10, 1999, Representative Smith,
Chair of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, was blunt in describing the perceived problems
of the present tide of immigration: "Many long-time residents are forced to move away from the com-
munities where they grew up. Those who appeal to the federal government for immigration law en-
forcement receive little or no help." Transcript of Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Immigration On
Claims of the Committee On the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 10 6 h Congress, I " Sus. (June 10,
1999) at 6 (http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju62494.000/hju62494 O.htm) (herein-
after Remarks of Rep. Smith). In discussing the effectiveness of the INS, Representative Smith was
equally direct: "Meanwhile, the interior enforcement strategy recently unveiled by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service effectively gives up on removing illegal aliens from the United States. Except for
a small fraction of convicted criminal aliens, illegal aliens have little or no fear that they will ever be
deported." Id.
6. Immigrant poverty is another deep concern. Although the level of poverty is higher among im-
migrants, significantly, only 10 % of immigrants who have become naturalized citizens live in poverty
as opposed to 29 % of non-citizen immigrants. Fix, supra note 3,
(http://www.urban.org/testimon/fix.htm)." Also underscoring the reality of poverty among immigrants
is a report by the Center for Immigration Studies indicating that the number of immigrant households
below poverty nearly tripled from 2.7 million in 1979 to 7.7 million in 1997. Michael A. Fletcher, Im-
migrants' Growing Role in U.S. Poverty Cited, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1999, at A2. Throughout that
same period, a relatively constant 12 % of the native born population lived in poverty while poverty
among immigrants increased from 15.5 to 21.8 %. Id.
7. As one court expressed its view toward INS processes: "The proceedings of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service are notorious for delay, and the opinions rendered by its judicial officers,
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abound.8 Accordingly, the unusual concentration of authority in the INS may
reflect not just standard acknowledgments of administrative expertise, but also
a judicial and legislative willingness to allocate public accountability for such
hapless responsibilities almost entirely to the INS.
The ambivalence of the immigration paradox has profound constitutional
dimensions. Perhaps no issue can be more basic than the threshold issue of the
right of aliens to remain in this country. Strikingly, however, this transcendent
question, a critical constitutional inquiry for millions of aliens,9 has not been
answered by the Supreme Court during the two decades since passage of the
historic Refugee Act of 1980, establishing a statutory right to seek asylum.' 0
When the issue of whether due process enveloped the alien's right to seek
asylum was presented to the Court in 1985, it declined to reach the constitu-
including the members of the Board of Immigration Appeals, often flunk minimum standards of adjudi-
cative rationality." Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 449 (7th Cir. 1995). In another case, the court ob-
served, "the Board seems unaware of the elementary facts of contemporary history, even those that bear
vitally on its mission." Osmani v. INS, 14 F.3d 13, 14 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Bastanipour v. INS, 980
F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The Board's handling of the question of apostasy makes us wonder
whether the Board's knowledge of Iran is any greater than its knowledge of Biafra, about which we
commented critically ...."). Other courts have also been blunt in expressing their skepticism. "Under
any ordinary meaning that decent, compassionate human beings would attach to the words 'abuse of
discretion,' the BIA has abused its discretion." Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 852 (9th Cir. 1995); see
also Melendez v. Dep't of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that INS position "turns
logic on its head," "extraneous influences" may have influenced INS and therefore "the administrative
proceeding in such case would simply be a charade.") Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 306 (5th Cir.
1997) ("The IJ gave cursory allegiance to both the Supreme Court's and this Circuit's precedent .... ).
In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) the Supreme Court
dismissed as a "mirage" the jurisdiction position advanced by the INS. Id. at 482.
8. While Congress and much of the public may criticize the INS for failing to do enough to contain
immigration, others castigate its heavy-handed measures. According to the Human Rights Watch World
Report 1999: United States: Human Rights Developments,
(http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/usa/index.html) (hereinafter Human Rights Report), the recent
enactment and subsequent enforcement of IIRIRA has led to widespread violations of international hu-
man rights standards against asylum seekers. Much of that concern centered on the INS's treatment and
incarceration of refugees:
More than half of the immigrants held in INS custody during 1998, some 9,000 people, were
sent to local jails to await immigration proceedings. Faced with an overwhelming, immediate
demand for detention space, the agency handed over control of its detainees to local sheriffs
and other jail officials without ensuring that basic international and national standards requir-
ing humane treatment and adequate conditions were met.
Id., at 8.
9. Although the issue of constitutional recognition for illegal and unadmitted aliens has varied
ramifications, the focus of this article is the right to seek asylum, a discretionary remedy permitting an
alien to remain in this country on account of potential persecution in a foreign land. The majority of
illegal immigrants who arrive on our shores seek a better life by leaving behind poor economic condi-
tions in their home countries. Although a laudable objective, and one often pursued heroically, at great
sacrifice and in the face of grave dangers, economics do not create a basis for asylum. Asylum may be
granted "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 423 (1987), citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (2000). Although asylum requires a particularized
showing, it is, for many, a process that should present a realistic hope for success. Significantly, the test
for showing a "well-founded fear" does not require a showing of probable harm and could, depending
on the circumstances, be satisfied by a ten percent prospect of persecution. 480 U.S. at 440.
10. 8 U.S.C. §1101 et. seq. (1994); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a) (1994).
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tional question and opted for disposition on purely statutory grounds. I' Nor
was any such constitutional right addressed in 1993, when the Court held that
the interdiction of aliens on the high seas fell beyond the jurisdictional reach of
the U.S. asylum laws and treaty obligations.' 2 As a result, the question of
whether aliens on U.S. soil have a constitutionally protected right to petition
for asylum has engendered deep conflict among the circuit courts of appeals.
13
That conflict, and the absence of recent Supreme Court guidance, parallel the
self-doubt that pervades much of our nation's immigration policy. With an es-
timated six million undocumented aliens within our borders, 14 few constitu-
tional questions today embody such uncertain implications for so many people.
Whatever may be the societal ambivalence that pervades immigration policy, it
cannot be acceptable for the law to leave unanswered the question of whether
so many men, women, and children who seek to remain here stand constitu-
tionally invisible in their quest. Indeed, the doctrines that have traditionally de-
fined the legal framework for those aspirations date back to the Nineteenth
Century, an age of myriad constitutional abdications.' 5 Plainly, in light of
modem constitutional decisions, the Supreme Court should revisit and deter-
mine the due process safeguards for asylum seekers.
As is demonstrated in the pages that follow, it is submitted that a principled
analysis of current due process doctrines will compel the conclusion that all
aliens on U.S. soil do indeed have a due process right to seek asylum. Begin-
ning with a brief overview of the early Supreme Court decisions, this Article
turns to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the landmark legislation con-
11. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
12. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (addressing extraterritorial effect of
U.S. asylum laws and treaty obligations). See also Cuban American Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43
F.3d 1412, 1424 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
13. As is analyzed below, most courts to address the issue have validated a due process right to an
asylum hearing. ) Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 F.3d 337 (4th Cit. 1999); Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d
328, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1984); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1034-38 (5th Cit. Unit B 1982). Other courts, including the Eleventh Circuit,
subdivided aliens finding that only deportable or admitted aliens have any constitutional interest in the
right to seek asylum even though it is congressionally mandated for all aliens in this country "irrespec-
tive of such alien's status." 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(1). Compare Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 1987) (citing Jean, 727 F.2d at 977). Meanwhile, the Third Circuit has recognized that unadmitted
aliens are constitutionally protected, Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1999), and finds
that their right to seek asylum requires judicially-imposed safeguards, but characterizes their due proc-
ess rights as a doctrine of statutory construction rather than a constitutional predicate. Marincas v.
Lewis, 92 F. 3d 195, 203 (3d Cit. 1996).
14. According to one source, as many as 6,000,000 illegal and undocumented aliens currently re-
side in the U.S. Remarks of Cong. Smith. This is roughly consistent with the INS estimate that, as of
October 1996, there were 5 million illegal aliens living in this country with the number growing by
275,000 each year. Steven Canarota, 5 Million Illegal Immigrants, An Analysis of New INS Numbers,
IMMIGRATION REVIEW No. 28 (Spring,1997), at (http://www.cis.org/articles/ 1997/IR28/Smillion.html).
That estimate assumes 420,000 new illegal entries annually, a total which is reduced by emigration,
deaths and adjustment to legal status.
15. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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ferring upon all aliens physically present within our lands a right to petition for
asylum. 16 Based on that congressional enactment, the analysis demonstrates
that a clear entitlement is created that due process must recognize and protect.
The existing judicial controversy among federal circuits is thus properly re-
solved by validating the constitutional imperative on terms required by the set-
tled principles of due process that govern all people within the sovereign juris-
diction of the United States.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. Immigrants and the U.S. Constitution
The saga of the immigrant's constitutional odyssey began in 1886 with the
historic decision of Yick Wo v. Hopkins.t7 In that case, the Supreme Court in-
validated a San Francisco ordinance which resulted in 200 Chinese laundries
being closed while 80 other laundries remained open, all operated by non-
Chinese. Finding that hostility to the race and nationality of petitioners could
not be constitutionally tolerated, the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause
to hold that their "rights ... are not less, because they are aliens and subjects of
the Emperor of China." Therefore, because the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment were universal in their application to "all persons within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction" of this country, the Court established that aliens were
within the arms of the Constitution.
Three years later, however, amidst intensifying public concerns about Chi-
nese immigration, 18 the Court decided the Chinese Exclusion case, 19 and issued
resounding support for the power of the federal government to control immi-
gration: "That the government of the United States ... can exclude aliens from
16. The asylum provision of the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(1) provides:
Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or
not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having
been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply
for asylum in accordance with this section, or where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title.
17. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
18. In 1882, Congress began its policy of restrictions by excluding Chinese from entry and citizen-
ship. Weisberger supra note 1, at 86. In 1924, Congress enacted the Johnson-Reed Act, which began to
assess various quota limits on immigrants from outside the Western Hemisphere.
19. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (validating legislation that prohibited
the return of Chinese laborers). While there were no quota-based restrictions on immigration prior to
1882, immigrants nonetheless confronted various forms of resistance, even hostility upon arrival. The
Irish were the focus of anti-immigrant feelings that accelerated through the 1840's. The potato famine
had created massive starvation that killed as many as a million of Ireland's 8.5 million inhabitants in
1845, prompting the first of many mass migrations to our shores. Such immigrants have not always been
welcome. Quinn, "The Tragedy of Bridget Such-A-One" American Heritage (Dec. 1997 at 36). "Our
Celtic fellow citizens," wrote a New York businessman, "are almost as remote from us in temperament
and constitution as the Chinese." Weisberger supra note 1, at 82. Some of the anti-Irish feeling stemmed
from anti-Catholic sentiments and led to acts of violence, including the burning of a convent in Boston
and pre-civil war riots in Philadelphia. Id. at 83.
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its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Juris-
diction over its territory to that extent is an incident of every independent na-
tion.",20 Therefore, while the Court established in Yick Wo the principle that ali-
ens residing here are not beyond the reach of the Constitution, it defined in
ensuing decisions a tradition of judicial unwillingness to extend rights to aliens
seeking admittance. The anxieties of border protection became a recurring
theme as the Supreme Court in 1892 further emphasized the right of the sover-
eign to exclude foreigners as "an accepted maxim of international law ... es-
sential to self preservation." 21 Along the same line, a year later, the Court in
Fong Yue Ting v. United States22 underscored the right to exclude or expel all
aliens as "an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent
nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare." As the public
enthusiasm for unrestricted immigration continued to plunge,23 court decisions
piled up greater obstacles to gaining entry to the United States. In 1903, the
Court observed that the power of Congress to "exclude aliens of a particular
race from the United States ... without judicial intervention, are principles
firmly established by the decisions of this court."24 While committing "the en-
forcement of the law to executive officers" the Court nonetheless declined to
deny aliens already living in the United States protection of the Constitution.
Thus, in Wong Wing v. United States, the Court rejected laws that subjected
illegal Chinese immigrants to imprisonment at hard labor.25 While explicitly
avoiding any mitigation of prior decisions on the issues of exclusion or admis-
sion, the Court nonetheless emphasized that, "[t]he provisions of the Fifth,
Sixth and Thirteenth Amendments of the Constitution apply as well to Chinese
persons who are aliens as to American citizens."26 Finding that "person" for
Fifth Amendment purposes includes, "any and every human being within the
jurisdiction of the republic," the Court held that aliens lawfully residing in this
country were entitled to "the same protection under the laws that a citizen is
entitled to."
27
As a result, the doctrine that developed in the late nineteenth century
largely removed "judicial intervention" from the gateways of entry to this
country. Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged the Constitution's recognition
20. 130 U.S. at 603-04.
21. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
22. 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893).
23. In the latter part of the 1 9
th century, the "immigrant problem" intensified. An Immigration Re-
striction League was formed among old New England families concerned about our "unguarded gates"
and the "wild motley throng" from Russia and Eastern Europe. Weisberger supra note 1, at 86.
24. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903).
25. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
26. 163 U.S. at 242.
27. Id.
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of all persons actually arriving in our territorial jurisdiction.28 Favorable dis-
tinctions were readily conferred upon resident aliens, individuals whose entry
was lawful but who might thereafter be subject to expulsion. 29
Other developments in legislation and case law would differentiate criti-
cally between "deportable" aliens and "excludables." 30 "Deportables" were ali-
ens who secured entry into this country, either lawfully or illegally, without
detection. Even if consigned to an illegal and undocumented status, the mere
fact of their unimpeded physical arrival in the United States would typically
require that any expulsion be predicated upon some form of deportation pro-
ceedings. "Excludable" aliens, on the other hand, never actually secured entry
into this country, illegally or lawfully.31 Often incarcerated by the authorities
pending determination of their fate,32 excludable aliens would often face sum-
mary or even immediate removal without the procedural safeguards of depor-
tation. In human terms, this bifurcation reflected an attempt to deal more com-
passionately with "deportables," those human beings who already stood within
U.S. borders. To underscore the border protection needs, however, constitu-
tional recognition was completely denied to aliens who had not yet physically
entered the country - the "excludables." 33 As one Court decision explained the
traditional duality,
[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who
have come to our shores seeking admission, such as petitioner, and those who are
within the United States after entry, irrespective of its illegality." 34 Ironically, this
dichotomy conferred greater legal protection upon aliens who entered the U.S. ille-
gally and secretly than those who attempted to seek refuge by presenting them-
selves unsuccessfully to the officials at ports of entry.
35
Because aliens who illegally crossed borders in the dead of night achieved
a "deportable" status while aliens detained when attempting to enter lawfully
were deemed "excludables," the law rewarded those illegal and undocumented
aliens who successfully avoided our laws by evading interception.
28. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) ("... no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without opportunity, at some time, to be heard.., although alleged to be illegally here. No such arbitrary
power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are recognized.")
29. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) ("... [O]nce an alien lawfully enters and resides in
this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders... None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between citizen and resident aliens.");
see also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 603 (1953) (due process required that alien who
was lawful permanent resident could not be detained and deported by Attorney General's order without
reasonable notice of charges and adequate hearing).
30. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
31. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1483-1484 (1lth Cir. 1985).
32. Id.
33. As explained by the Supreme Court, "... 'exclusion' means preventing someone from entering
the United States who is actually outside of the United States or is treated as being so." Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.4 (1953).
34. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 596 U.S. 155, 175 (1993).
35. Augustin v. Sava, 735 F. 2d 32, 36 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1984).
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In addition to fostering unfairness, the deportable/excludable analysis also
spawned other analytic contradictions. Because the legal determinant was
based on the fact of physical entry into the United States, cases sought a ra-
tionalization for the status of aliens who remained present within our borders
in detention or other forms of custody following interception by immigration
authorities. As a result, the Court developed the so-called "entry fiction," a
doctrine treating as "excludables" those aliens who were within government
custody on U.S. lands following interception at the border as if they had never
entered the country.
36
These principles were revalidated during the McCarthy era37 as the Su-
preme Court underscored the wholesale entrustment of immigration responsi-
bilities to the executive branch. For example, in United States ex rel. Knauffv.
Shaughnessy,38 the Court held that an alien spouse of a U.S. citizen could be
excluded from this country based on secret information without any form of
hearing, a startling view of individual rights in any other context in our coun-
try. Similarly, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,39 the Court af-
firmed the extended detention of an alien finding that, the "right to enter the
United States depends on the congressional will, and courts cannot substitute
their judgment for the legislative mandate." As a result, even though the alien
had been detained on Ellis Island for twenty-one months without any allegation
of criminal wrongdoing, the Court concluded that immigration actions by other
branches of government are "largely immune from judicial control.,
40
As before, lawfully residing aliens were accorded far more rights. As a re-
sult, the Court held that the Constitution required a fair hearing before depor-
tation could be effected.4 1 Thus, in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaugh-
nessy,42 the Court found that the INS had failed to observe its own regulations
in effecting the deportation of a resident alien. Because the Attorney General
had publicly identified the alien subject as an undesirable, the Court reasoned
that the resulting expulsion order, based on administrative proceedings con-
ducted by an agency headed by that same Attorney General, failed to provide
36. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953); Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 661 (1892)
37. Because of the "fear ridden climate of McCarthysm," attempts to overhaul the immigration
laws in 1952 were made but maintained the national origins quotas. Nonetheless, because of concern
about refugees from China as well as Hungary in the wake of the failed anti-Soviet uprising, special
dispensations were made reflecting that refugees from these countries were fleeing communism. Weis-
berger supra note 1, at 87.
38. 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
39. 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953).
40. 345U.S.at2lO.
41. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953); See also Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374
U.S. 449 (1963) (stating that an "innocent," casual and "brief' trip does not constitute a new entry that
would forfeit a resident alien's right to remain in this country.).
42. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
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the requisite fair and objective process. Therefore, while the Court did not
validate the inherent rights of aliens to seek admission to this country, it found
that when statutes and regulations provided particular safeguards, those rights
should be judicially enforced based on constitutional due process. 43
Accordingly, while Nineteenth Century doctrine continued to govern the
immigrant's right to enter our country, due process reached those who had
physically arrived. Resident aliens received most of the constitutional safe-
guards enjoyed by U.S. citizens. Even for illegally entering aliens, their status
as "deportables" activated procedural due process that included the right to a
fair hearing. Like other facets of immigration, though, the result of preferring
illegal secret entrants to law-abiding asylum seekers was a policy of contra-
dictory legal tenets and logistical inefficacy. Honest refugees were being dra-
matically penalized; illegal entry was effectively encouraged; border crossings
were not substantially reduced and, if anything, more covert entries were as-
sured.
B. The Refugee Act of 1980
Throughout the decades of inconsistency and frustration, the Congress's
inaction on the issue of the alien's right to live in our country corresponded to
the limited initiatives of the judiciary.44 In fact, no federal statute delineated a
right to seek asylum in this country and so the legislative vacuum was filled by
executive branch regulations.45 The legislative absenteeism was transformed,
however, by a succession of international norms and conventions that reshaped
the world's perspective toward refugees in the aftermath of the horrors of
World War 11.46
43. Described in later cases as the Accardi doctrine, this principle provides for judicial enforce-
ment when an agency fails to follow its own established procedures. Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 166
(2d Cir. 1991). As described in Montilla, it is "premised on fundamental notions of fair play underlying
the concept of due process." 926 F.2d at 167.
44. Thus, the Supreme Court "has repeatedly emphasized that 'over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). This philosophy of expansive consignment to the other branches of govern-
ment cascades across court decisions. Earlier, Justice Frankfurter wrote that, "Policies pertaining to the
entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of gov-
ernment." Galvon v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
45. Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, more humane legislation was passed in
1965, the same year that saw the passage of landmark civil rights legislation and other components of
the Great Society. In large part, the new immigration legislation attempted to reduce reliance on national
origin quotes and instead delineated policy considerations such as the objectives of reuniting families,
opening access to refugees and attracting certain skills and professions. In signing the legislation at the
base of the Statue of Liberty, President Lyndon Johnson observed that, "the days of unlimited immigra-
tion are past. But those who come will come because of what they are - not because of the land from
which they sprung." Weisberger supra note 1, at 88.
46. In addition to addressing finally the post-World War II momentum of the international com-
munity, the back drop of congressional action in 1980 included the fall of U.S. supported governments
in Cambodia and South Vietnam in 1975. Those events "unleashed floods of refugees who are a special
responsibility of the United States." Id. at 89.
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In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was issued which in-
cluded recognition of each nation's duty to consider granting sanctuary to
refugees fleeing persecution.4 7 This broad proclamation crystallized further
with the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in
1951 ("UN Convention").48 The obligations owed by countries to refugees
were emphasized again in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, which the U.S. signed one year later ("UN Protocol").
49
That Protocol adopted certain provisions of the U.N. Convention to define spe-
cific rights to seek asylum for refugees escaping persecution. While the United
States did not become a direct party to the U.N. Convention, by signing the
1967 Protocol, it accepted by reference the duty to accept refugees "where
their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their political opin-
ion."
,50
Congress's commitment to this world-wide transformation centered upon
the Refugee Act of 1980, which embodied post-war norms and evolving ethics
concerning refugees:
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the definition of "refugee," and
indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress's primary purposes was to
bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
52
47. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions arising from non-political crimes
or other acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
48. The UN Convention described the world community's "profound concern for refugees" and
the "social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees" in its preamble. In its definitional sec-
tion, it set forth the standard of a "well-founded fear of being persecuted by reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion," a criterion that would later be
embodied in U.S. asylum laws. Article 33 thus imposed a prohibition of the involuntary return of refu-
gees "where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion." Art. 33(1), UN Convention.
49. 19 U.S.T. 6223; 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1967). The UN Protocol reaffirmed the international com-
mitment to refugees. Broadening its scope to encompass new refugee situations arising after 1951, it
reincorporated Articles 2 through 34 of the treaty retaining the definition of "refugees" embodied in the
UN Convention.
50. Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005, 1006 n.4 (5 th Cir. 1971).
51. Subsequent to the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the international community has continued
to address concerns for refugees in related contexts. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
provides that participating nations:
shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is
considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and proce-
dures and shall, whether accompanied or unaccompanied by his parents or by any other per-
son, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable
rights...
Another international compact, while not centered on refugee issues, provides that even if wrong-
fully abducted, a child should not be returned to the nation of origin if there is "grave risk" of "physical
or psychological harm" if such repatriation would place the child "in an intolerable situation." Art.
13(b), Hague Convention On The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction.
52. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987).
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To fulfill our nation's pledge to the refugee community, Congress enacted
the right to seek asylum and required the executive branch to establish a uni-
form procedure for such adjudications:
It is the intention of the Conference that the Attorney General should immediately
create a uniform procedure for the treatment of asylum claims. Present regulations
and procedures now used by the immigration service do not conform to either the
spirit or to the new provisions of this Act.
53
This enactment marked a watershed in the rights of all aliens within our
nation's borders. "Prior to the 1980 amendments there was no statutory basis
for granting asylum to aliens who applied from within the United States." 54 As
a result of this landmark legislation, "Congress, therefore, established for the
first time a provision in federal law specifically relating to requests for asy-
lum." 55 Along with uniformity and consistency, the Refugee Act was enacted
to give "statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and
humanitarian concerns."
56
In validating the right to seek asylum, the congressional mandate resonated
across the landscape of concepts such as "excludable," "deportable," "admit-
ted" or "unadmitted" to reach every alien physically present in the United
States:
Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the
United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien
who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or
United States waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum in
accordance with this section, or where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title. 57
Accordingly, by its own terms, the 1980 Refugee Act discarded traditional
status-based distinctions concerning the right to apply for asylum so long as
the alien is "physically present in the United States. "58
53. 125 Cong. Rec. 3, 759 (1979) (emphasis added).
54. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 433.
55. Orantes-Hemandez v. Thomburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 552 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1990).
56. S.Rep. No. 256, 9 6
th Cong., 4, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1980, at 141. In amending the
Immigration and Nationality Act, the Refugee Act of 1980 was conceived primarily "to provide a per-
manent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian
concern to the United States." Pub.L. 96-212, tit. 1. §101(b), 94 Stat. 102 (1980). In providing statuto-
rily for a uniform asylum procedure for refugees, the Refugee Act brought U.S. laws into conformity
with the treaty obligations of the U.N. Protocol. Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1996).
Thus, in its preamble, the Act proclaimed "the historic policy of the United States to respond to the ur-
gent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands." Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212,
94 Stat. 102 (1980).
57. 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(1) (emphasis added).
58. Id. The legislative history of the asylum law emphasized the necessity of requiring a uniform
asylum process. "The bill requires the Attorney General to establish a uniform procedure for passing
upon an asylum application." S. Rep. Number 256 at 96 Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
Code Cong. & Adm. News, 141, 149 (cited in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F. 2d 957 (1 1 1h Cir. 1984), affd on
other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (emphasis supplied)).
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C. Modern Supreme Court Developments
The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutional impact of the
Refugee Act of 1980. Because due process reaches any "person" within the
United States, it has been held, as a general proposition, that it reaches all ali-
ens within our jurisdiction.59 Therefore, in Mathews v. Diaz, while rejecting
the due process claim challenging a five-year residency requirement for aliens
seeking federal medical benefits, the Court confirmed the Constitution's rec-
ognition of aliens. As the Court expressed the threshold issue, "Even one
whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary or transitory is entitled
to that constitutional protection." 6' In 1982, the Court held in Plyler v. Doe
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraced alien
school children. Although undocumented and illegal, they were constitution-
ally entitled to public education at the taxpayer's expense.
62
Beyond those broad premises, however, the specific constitutional ques-
tions concerning asylum-seeking have not been examined by the Supreme
Court. Even so, a broad statement from a 1982 court decision addressing re-
entry issues continues to influence several courts concerning asylum. In Lan-
don v. Plasencia, the Court described the right of aliens to seek initial admis-
sion as a "privilege." 63 That mention represents dictum because the Court
found that the alien facing deportation in that case did indeed have constitu-
tional rights.64 Holding that the alien continued to be a permanent resident after
a trip abroad, she therefore retained her due process rights to a fair hearing
when threatened with deportation. Therefore, the Court had no occasion to dis-
cuss, much less determine, whether the newly enacted Refugee Act of 1980
created a right to seek asylum with due process implications. Even so, later cir-
cuit court decisions would cite the Landon reference to "privilege" without ac-
knowledging its limited force as a dictum or discussing the fact that it arose in
a pre-Refugee Act setting.
65
59. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). There are literally millions of aliens within the ju-
risdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects
every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
238 (1895); See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931); see also Wang v.
Reno, 81 F. 3d 808, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990)) ("However, as the Verdugo-Urquidez Court expressly noted, the Fifth Amendment provides
protection to the "person" rather than "the people."); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir.
1987) (illegal, unadmitted alien, a "person" for due process purposes and cannot constitutionally be
subjected to physical abuse).
60. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
61. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.
62. 457 U.S. 202, 223-226 (1982).
63. 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982), on remand, 719 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1983).
64. Landon, 459 U.S. at 34.
65. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc), affd on non-constitutional
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM
A. The Fifth and Second Circuits Apply Due Process
In the decades following the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act, the gaps
in Supreme Court decision-making have led to dramatic divergences among
the circuit courts concerning the reach of due process. The first important de-
cision, Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,66 arose in the Fifth Circuit under facts
occurring prior to the effective date of the asylum legislation. One year before
the enactment of the 1980 legislation,67 a class action of over 4,000 Haitian
refugees challenged INS procedures in Miami that were tantamount to per-
functory, assembly-line rituals providing each applicant with a hearing that av-
eraged 15 minutes of substantive dialogue. 68 With only twelve attorneys avail-
able to represent those thousands of applicants, and each asylum officer
conducting 40 such proceedings daily, the applicants were frequently unrepre-
sented because of scheduling conflicts. 69 Not surprisingly in view of these ab-
ject processes, the INS refused asylum for all of the 4,000 Haitian applicants
during the course of this program.70
The district court found that the INS's "wide variety of defects" in the
processing of Haitian asylum claims violated, among other things, the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.7 1 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit re-
viewed the inadequate procedures of the INS and affirmed. Its starting point
for analysis was the Supreme Court's recognition, in Mathews v. Diaz,72 that
the Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth Amendment, protects even illegal
aliens within the jurisdiction of our country. 73 While acknowledging the broad
power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether, the court found that "the ex-
ecutive is subject to the constraints of due process" in implementing congres-
sional immigration policy.74 Although observing that there are protected inter-
ests that originate in the Constitution itself, the court further recognized a
separate source of liberty and property interests predicated upon state and fed-
eral laws that create "a substantive entitlement to a particular governmental
benefit." Examining asylum procedure established by the INS's own regula-
grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); See also Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 1996); Amanullah
v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 8 (1987).
66. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982)
67. The right to seek asylum prior to 1980 was established by an INS regulation, 8 C.F.R.§108.
68. Haitan Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1031.
69. Id. at 1031. Not infrequently, counsel for asylum applicants would confront three hearings at
the same hour in different buildings.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1036 (citing Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F.Supp. 442,455 (S.D. Fla. 1980)).
72. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
73. Haitan Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1036.
74. Id.
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tion, in conjunction with Congress's adoption of the UN Protocol in 1967, the
Court concluded that aliens had been granted a right to submit and substantiate
their claim for asylum.75 Based on the creation of that substantive entitlement,
the court applied the due process doctrine of Supreme Court cases like Morris-
sey v. Brewer76 and found that the Constitution safeguarded the right to seek
asylum. Because federal law established a right to petition for asylum, this en-
titlement gave rise to a protectible liberty interest, 77 even if the decision to
grant asylum was discretionary.
Therefore, while finding no constitutional right concerning the granting of
asylum itself, the court found that due process was invoked by the right to seek
this remedy. "Although fragile, the right to petition is nevertheless a valuable
one to its possessor. ' ,79 Because the right to apply for asylum stood upon a
foundation of procedural due process, the court found that "some form of
hearing" was required, and that the hearing must be conducted "at a meaning-
ful time and in a meaningful manner." 80 Applying the three-part test of
Mathews v. Eldridge,81 the court, upon weighing the private interest at stake,
the likelihood of error and the government's interest, found that the Haitian
deportation program violated due process.
While the aliens before the court in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith were
allegedly deportables who had entered South Florida illegally, the Fifth Circuit
did not rely on traditional distinctions elevating the status of deportable aliens
over excludables. Instead, the court found that due process reached asylum
seekers based on two premises: first, that the Constitution and due process had
universal application to all people within our borders, even those whose pres-
ence might be "unlawful, involuntary or transitory" 82 and, second, that the ap-
plicable INS regulation and U.S. treaty commitments established a substantive
right to present an asylum claim.83 Predicated upon these conclusions, the court
applied modem due process cases concerning governmental entitlements,
rather than long-standing alienage doctrine defining the constitutional rights of
"deportables." Later Fifth Circuit decisions would further dispel any thesis
75. Haitan Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1037.
76. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
77. Haitan Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1037. The Court cited the Japanese Immigrant Case, 189
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903), for the principle that deportation proceedings implicate the alien's liberty inter-
est in the right to remain in the U.S.
78. Haitan Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1038.
79. Id. at 1039.
80. Id. at 1039 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)).
81. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
82. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 77.
83. Haitan Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 1038-39. Subsequently, the finding that the ratification of
the UN Protocol conferred enforceable federal rights was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Haitian
Refugee Center v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109,1110 (1 th Cir. 1991).
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that Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith and the Due Process clause were confined
to deportable aliens.
84
Two years later, the Second Circuit expressly invoked the Refugee Act of
1980 in Augustin v. Sava85 to hold that the absence of adequate translation of
asylum proceedings violated the procedural due process rights of a Haitian
refugee. Applying analysis that paralleled Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, the
court, like the Fifth Circuit, found no inherent constitutional rights in the asy-
lum process, but reasoned that aliens "do have such statutory rights as Con-
gress grants."86 Because the Refugee Act of 1980 conferred upon aliens a sub-
stantive entitlement to seek asylum, the court ruled that, while a grant of
asylum is discretionary, the right to apply for asylum and receive a fair hearing
required adequate procedural safeguards.
87
Reviewing the traditional distinction between "excludables" and "deport-
ables," the Second Circuit concluded that Augustin had waived any claim of
"deportable" status by failing to raise the issue below and was therefore subject
to exclusion proceedings. Even so, the court criticized the doctrines that ac-
corded illegal deportable entrants greater rights than those excludables who
had properly petitioned for entry.
88
Rather than historic alienage analysis, the court applied the broadly pre-
vailing due process cases 89 in light of the entitlement to seek asylum estab-
lished by the Refugee Act. As a result, even though the court held that
Augustin was "excludable," he was still protected by due process. Addressing
the merits of the due process claim, the court found that his asylum hearing had
been fraught with apparent confusion and error due to inadequate translations
of Augustin's native Creole. Accordingly, the court found he was denied a rea-
sonable opportunity to present this asylum claim and remanded with directions
to assure a fair hearing.
84. In Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1375 (5th Cir. 1987), the court found that "exclud-
ables," even illegal stowaways apprehended aboard a barge, remained within the reach of due process
and could not be physically abused by port officials. "Excludable aliens are not non-persons." See also
Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 289 (5th Cir. 1999) (while status can affect measure of protec-
tion, "in this Circuit it is clear" that excludables are within the ambit of the Constitution).
85. 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984). Previously, in the context of alien detention, the Second Circuit
had seemingly minimized due process for excludable Haitians in Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d
Cir. 1982). That decision encompassed the issues of detention and parole of aliens, matters that are ex-
plicitly committed to the discretion of the Attorney General. By contrast, the right to seek asylum, is not
a humble suggestion to the INS, but rather, represents a mandate of Congress.
86. 735 F.2d at 36.
87. Augustin, 735 F.2d at 37. The Second Circuit cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith, as well as the original panel decision by the Eleventh Circuit in Jean v. Nelson,
711 F.2d 1455 (1 1h Cir. 1983), vacated, 727 F.2d 957 (11' Cir. 1984) (en banc).
88. Augustin, 735 F.2d at 36 n.11.
89. Id. at 37 (citing Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974)).
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B. Jean v. Nelson and the Denial of Constitutional Safeguards
One year later, however, the en banc Eleventh Circuit initiated a constitu-
tional perspective in opposition to those holdings in Jean v. Nelson.90 Strik-
ingly, the genesis of the Eleventh Circuit doctrine was not conceived upon the
right to seek asylum. Instead, the Jean class action was brought on behalf of
Haitian aliens being held in various INS detention facilities pending exclusion
proceedings. Rather than the right to receive a fair asylum hearing, the center
of the Fifth and Second Circuit holdings, the facts of Jean v. Nelson stood
largely in the fundamentally different province of "challenging the govern-
ment's refusal to grant them parole." 91 Because the issues in Jean v. Nelson did
not include the actual right to seek asylum, the court had no occasion to discuss
the impact of the statutory entitlement conferred by the Refugee Act of 1980.
Instead, the court's opinion spoke primarily to INS responsibility for managing
the detention and parole of aliens who faced pending exclusion proceedings.
Unlike petitioning for asylum, an entitlement guaranteed by Congress in 1980,
matters of alien detention as well as release in the form of parole 92 were ex-
plicitly delegated by statute to the discretion of the Attorney General. Unde-
niably, these are subjects that present a daunting array of logistical, adminis-
trative and practical issues. Like other courts, the Eleventh Circuit described
the temporary release of an otherwise ineligible alien to be "an act of extraor-
dinary sovereign generosity. ' 93 According to the court's comprehensive survey
of federal case law, the only circuit decision to have imposed due process lim-
its upon INS discretion over the detention of excludable aliens was a Tenth
Circuit holding that invalidated the indefinite detention of Mariel refugees.
94
As a result, rather than a direct treatment of the right to seek asylum, Jean v.
Nelson unveiled a compendium of tributes to deference to the INS centering on
issues of detention and release.
90. 727 F.2d. 957 (1 1th Cir. 1984)
91. Id. at 962.
92. Id. at 963 (citing 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)(a)). In the immigration context, parole represents a dis-
cretionary determination to release an alien from INS physical custody, which can encompass temporary
liberty as well as a permanent discharge. One frequently disputed scenario is the detainee's obvious
desire for a temporary release allowing the alien to remain at liberty pending the determination of the
immigration status through administrative or judicial proceedings. Detention issues have been litigated
regularly and successfully by the INS which has been accorded wide discretion in treating, for example,
the status of 2,746 Mariel Cubans. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11 " Cir. 1985). Even in dealing
with juveniles, the Supreme Court reversed both lower courts to underscore the broad latitude of the
INS in handling detention, parole and release issues. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
93. Jean, 727 F.2d at 972.
94. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10h Cir. 1981). In that case, the court held
an alien who had been held for more than a year in a maximum security federal prison could not be
"punished" through an incarceration of limitless duration. Illustrating perhaps colorfully the necessary
presence of at least minimal constitutional safeguards, the court noted that, "Surely Congress could not
order the killing of Rodriguez-Fernandez and others in his status on the ground that Cuba would not
take them back and this country does not want them." 654 F.2d at 1387.
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Although not a primary focus, asylum rights did not emerge unscathed
from Jean v. Nelson. Because the plaintiffs had claimed below that the INS
was affirmatively obliged to inform aliens of their right to seek asylum, this
alleged duty of notification was drawn into the analysis. Citing the declaration
in Landon v. Plasencia95 that an alien seeking admission invokes merely a
"privilege," the Court not only rejected the theory of Miranda-type notifica-
tion, it issued a broader opposition to due process for excludable aliens: "Ali-
ens seeking admission to the United States therefore have no constitutional
rights with regard to their applications and must be content to accept whatever
statutory rights and privileges are granted by Congress." 96 While noting that
the government granted significant benefits to aliens, including the right to an
asylum hearing, the court omitted any mention of the Supreme Court doctrine
that imbued such entitlements with due process. From its premise of rejecting a
constitutional duty to notify aliens of their asylum rights, the Court proceeded
to disavow the constitutional ruling of Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith that
had applied due process simply to assure fair hearings.97 Even so, the Eleventh
Circuit sustained certain of the alien's claims on non-constitutional grounds
due to alleged failures to comply with the INS's own regulatory criteria con-
cerning parole and detention.
98
Because Jean v. Nelson arose from critically different facts than Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith, its sweeping reference to a lack of due process in the
asylum process could have been applied restrictively by its later decisions,
even reconciled with the Fifth Circuit holding. As matters would develop,
99
95. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
96. Jean, 727 F.2d at 968.
97. Id. at 976 n. 27. While dramatically undercutting the constitutional rights of excludable aliens
in the asylum process, the Eleventh Circuit nonetheless recognized the extensive case law extending to
others constitutional guarantees in matters ranging from criminal prosecutions, Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), to unlawful takings of property. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States,
282 U.S. 481,489 (1931).
98. Jean, 727 F.2d at 976 ("agency deviation from its own regulations and procedures may justify
judicial relief').
99. The Eleventh Circuit's deepening opposition to constitutional recognition of asylum rights
may have been due, at least in part, to the unique dilemma posed by criminal aliens arriving from Ma-
riel, a minute but problematic component of the 1980 influx of some 125,000 refugees. In discussing
the Mariel detainees, one court noted that, "[m]any of them were hardened convicts" whose return was
refused by the Cuban government. Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1999). "Conse-
quently, many of the Mariel Cubans - approximately 1,750 - still remain in INS detention because of
their danger to the community." Id. One year after the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Jean v. Nelson, that
court confronted a class action on behalf of the Mariel detainees for which the district court had granted
certain relief, ordering some to be released. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (1 1th Cir. 1985). In ad-
dressing the district court's premise that the Mariel plaintiffs "should be accorded at least some of the
legal protections given to those who have effected entry into this country," 766 F.2d at 1483, the Elev-
enth Circuit issued a resounding rejection of any notion that excludable aliens-enjoy constitutional pro-
tection concerning their initial admission to the U.S. Id. at 1483-84. Although its constitutional discus-
sion was addressed only to the detention issues, and the right to seek asylum under the 1980 Refugee
Act was nowhere mentioned, the court relied on Jean v. Nelson to assert a broad erasure of rights con-
cerning asylum. 766 F. 2d at 1482-84.
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however, subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases would instead firmly entrench the
view that due process does not reach aliens seeking refuge in this country. 100
When Jean v. Nelson reached the Supreme Court in 1985, the constitu-
tional tension among the Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' due process
holdings was not resolved.10 1 Instead, the Court declined to reach the Fifth
Amendment issue10 2 and sustained the lower court findings that valid claims
had been raised against the INS based on statutory and regulatory criteria. Jus-
tice Marshall dissented to the refusal to address the constitutional questions in
an extensive opinion joined by Justice Brennan. 10 3 The dissent argued that,
first, excludable aliens clearly enjoy Fifth Amendment protection in matters
such as criminal prosecution; second, existing precedent precluded unlawful
deprivations of an alien's property interests; and, third, denying due process to
excludable aliens could not be logically supported since, for example, the At-
torney General presumably could not "justify a decision to stop feeding all de-
tained aliens. '1 4  Because neither the Court majority in Jean v. Nelson nor
any later decision would address the due process issues, the dissent of Justice
Marshall would remain, even today, the last words written on the subject of
due process for excludable aliens by any member of the Supreme Court. 
105
100. In Gonzalez v. Reno, 215 F.3d 1243 (1 1th Cir. 2000), the Court summarily rejected due proc-
ess for six-year-old Elian based on Jean v. Nelson. In Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338, 1361 (11th
Cir. 1998) the court cited Landon v. Plasencia, supra, and U.S. ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, supra, to
reaffirm the broad proposition that "an alien seeking admission to the United States has no constitu-
tional rights regarding an application for admission." In another Eleventh Circuit holding to oppose the
rationales of Smith, the Court held in Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11 ' Cir.
1991) that Haitian plaintiffs had no enforceable rights under the UN Protocol because the key provision
found in Article 33 was not self-executing. See also Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1483-84 (11"
Cir. 1985) (Parole and detention case in which excludable aliens were said to have no constitutional
rights in the asylum process based on Jean v. Nelson). On the other hand, when a lawfully admitted
alien faced deportation based on a felony conviction, the Eleventh Circuit confirmed his constitutionally
protected status and overrode the INS's refusal to let him seek waiver of deportation. Yeung v. INS, 76
F.3d 337 (11t Cir. 1995).
101. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
102. Id. at 854. In opting for decision on non-constitutional grounds, the Court observed: "This is
a 'fundamental rule of judicial restraint." Id. (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Berthold Reservation v.
Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138 (1984)).
103. Id. at 856.
104. Id. at 874. Presumably because the core issue was detention rather than seeking asylum, the
dissent did not address the Refugee Act of 1980 or the Court's modem series of procedural due process
cases.
105. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993), the court addressed the rights of
aliens interdicted on the high seas to seek a withholding of deportation. Because the Court's analysis
centered on finding no extra-territorial application of the relevant immigration laws, its holding did not
implicate asylum rights for those on U.S. lands. In Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), the Supreme
Court examined the constitutional adequacy of INS regulations governing the detention ofjuvenile ali-
ens. Because the Court found that the role of due process in deportation proceedings was well-
established, 507 U.S. at 306, it neither analyzed more broadly the threshold standards for activating due
process nor addressed the rights of excludable aliens. Id.
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C. The Circuit Conflict Continues To Grow
With the Supreme Court's decision not to reach the due process issues, the
aftermath of Jean v. Nelson left the Fifth and Second Circuits in conflict with
the Eleventh Circuit doctrine that would continue to reject constitutional asy-
lum rights for excludable aliens. This divergence apparently expanded in 1987
when the First Circuit repeated the Eleventh Circuit's broad disclaimers of due
process in the asylum scenario. 1 6 In that case, several refugees from war-tom
Afghanistan had been confined in INS detention centers for months following
their arrival in the U.S. through third countries, an arrival secured with the use
of bogus documents. Like the en banc decision in Jean, Amanullah v. Nelson
treated detention and parole for excludable aliens, not their right to a funda-
mentally fair asylum hearing. Even so, citing the Eleventh Circuit holding as
well as the "requests a privilege" statement from Landon v. Plasencia, the
First Circuit reiterated the general thesis that aliens seeking admission have no
constitutional rights with regard to their applications and denied the refugees'
due process claims.
107
Several years later, the circuit split deepened further as the Circuit for the
District of Columbia in Maldonado-Perez v. INS10 8 followed the Fifth Circuit's
analysis to recognize a procedural due process right to petition the government
for political asylum. 10 9 Relying on Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, the D.C.
Circuit found that due process enfolded a Salvadoran farmer who illegally en-
tered Texas without inspection and suffered an adverse deportation order fol-
lowing a hearing in absentia. While determining that due process did not create
a right to asylum itself, the court ruled that it required "a meaningful or fair
evidentiary hearing with a reasonable opportunity to be present.""10 Conclud-
ing that due process did indeed apply, the court found that, because the appli-
cant had been accorded a fair opportunity to be present at his hearing, there
was no constitutional violation."' 1 In framing the analysis, the court did not
rely on Maldonado-Perez's apparent status as a deportable alien. Instead, the
court cited the Fifth Circuit's due process holding, as well as non-immigration
Supreme Court decisions that define due process in broader settings, such as
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.112 As a result, the D.C. Circuit, like the Sec-
106. Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1 (I' Cir. 1987). Although not treating the issue of the right
to seek and substantiate asylum, the sweeping language of Amanullah and its general adherence to Jean
v. Nelson indicated an alignment with the Eleventh Circuit's positions concerning due process and asy-
lum seekers.
107. 811 F.2d at 9. ("To be sure, outside the context of admission and exclusion procedures, ex-
cludable aliens do have due process rights.").
108. 275 U.S. App. D.C. 109, 865 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
109. 865 F.2d at 331.
110. Id. at 333.
Ill. Id. at 337.
112. 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982).
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ond Circuit in Augustin v. Sava, relied on the Refugee Act of 1980 as the
source of substantive entitlement that created the protectible interest that war-
ranted constitutional safeguards."1
3
With five courts issuing varying declarations on opposing sides of a critical
due process issue, the Third Circuit offered a third position in 1996 that was
lodged in the middle of the divide. In Marincas v. Lewis, 114 the court addressed
the asylum rights of stowaway aliens, traditionally among the least favored of
immigrant asylum seekers. The alien in Marincas, a former soldier in the Ro-
manian army, challenged an interview procedure for stowaways that did not
provide a neutral fact-finder to hear the claim initially and lacked other basic
safeguards. Observing that the INS regulations distinguished between the pro-
cedures governing stowaways and those afforded other applicants, the court
found that stowaway asylum claims were not being determined by "a neutral
immigration law judge with a full panoply of due process safeguards."'115 Upon
analysis of the INS's procedures for stowaways, the Third Circuit found that
they were legally inadequate and held that these immigrants were entitled to
the same asylum procedures extended to other applicants.
The court's holding, though, did not rely on constitutional due process. In-
deed, the Court specifically held that the stowaway applicants were not entitled
to constitutional protection in seeking admission to the United States.! 16 This
finding was not detailed and was apparently premised upon a recitation of the
Supreme Court's reference in Landon v. Plasencia to the seeking of asylum
as a "privilege" rather than a constitutional right." 7 While expressly dis-
claiming any application of constitutional analysis," 8 the Third Circuit none-
theless relied on general due process cases decided by the Supreme Court on
constitutional grounds. 1
9
To construct a due process methodology upon a non-constitutional founda-
tion, the court relied on the judicial duty to construe federal statutes like the
Refugee Act consistently with congressional intent because "it can be assumed
that Congress intends that procedure to be a fair one. ' 20 Even though basing
its analysis upon tenets of statutory construction, the Third Circuit explicitly
spoke in terms of due process. Thus, to effectuate the 1980 Refugee Act's
mandate for an asylum procedure, as well as U.S. treaty obligations and max-
113. 865 F.2d at 337.
114. 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996).
115. Id. at 200.
116. Id. at 203.
117. Id. at 203.
118. The Third Circuit did not cite Jean v. Nelson. Instead, while rejecting any role for constitu-
tional due process, it cited approvingly the Second Circuit's decision in Augustin v. Sava.
119. Id. at 203 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976)).
120. Id. at 203 (citing Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979)).
Vol. 19:303, 2001
The Due Process Right To Seek Asylum
ims of fundamental fairness, the court held that the INS process had to pro-
vide "the most basic of due process."' 21 Rejecting any contention that, as "ex-
cludable aliens," stowaways deserved a deprecated form of asylum hearing, the
court observed that the congressional mandate for asylum procedures applied
"irrespective of such alien's status."' 122 In finding that stowaway applicants
therefore deserved the same asylum process created for other applicants, the
court required a number of safeguards, including: a hearing before a neutral
immigration judge; a transcribed record of proceedings and adequate transla-
tion services; notification of the applicant's right to counsel; the availability of
free legal representation; the right to submit evidence and to present and sub-
poena witnesses; and the right seek subsequent administrative review.
123
Accordingly, while acknowledging the "privilege" language of Landon v.
Plasencia and expressly gainsaying any reliance on constitutional analysis, the
decision in Marincas v. Lewis clearly applied due process principles to over-
ride multiple procedural infirmities in the INS's asylum procedures. 2 4 There-
fore, seemingly to reconcile the Supreme Court's 1982 reference to "privilege"
with the subsequent analysis evolving under the Refugee Act, the court
avoided any constitutional labeling by crafting a purely statutory thesis of due
process.
In another appellate encounter with stowaway aliens, the Fourth Circuit
stated a succinct but clear rationale for validating their constitutional due proc-
ess right to seek asylum in the 1999 decision of Selgeka v. Carroll.125 An eth-
nic Albanian fleeing Kosovo, Selgeka stowed away aboard a U.S. ship in Janu-
ary, 1996, and thus the substance of his claim arose before the effective date of
the 1996 immigration legislation. 2 6 Besnik Selgeka claimed that he had been
denied procedural due process because his right to asylum was not determined
by an impartial immigration judge in a hearing with appropriate safeguards. 127
128 129Citing decisions such as Marincas v. Lewis. and Augustin v. Sava the
121. Id. at 203.
122. Id. at 201.
123. Id. at 204. Evidently, these applicants had already invoked the asylum process and, thus, any
concomitant duties of notification, arguably different circumstances than those of aliens facing removal
who had not yet requested asylum, the scenario found in Jean v. Nelson.
124. Even though indicating its conformity to the words of Landon v. Plasencia, the Third Circuit
made approving referehces to Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32 (2d. Cir. 1984). Moreover, it applied the
same methodology utilized by in the Second Circuit in relying upon the 1980 Refugee Act and other
sources of federal law to define the source of statutory entitlement that should be safeguarded by due
process.
125. 184 F.3d 337 (4 t Cir. 1999).
126. The only feature of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act rele-
vant to Selgeka was the jurisdictional provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), a provision which did not change
the outcome of the case. Selgeka, 184 F.3d at 340-44.
127. Id. at 341-42,
128. 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996)
129. 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984).
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court similarly found that aliens have no independent constitutional right to
asylum but enjoy minimum due process concerning statutory entitlements. By
virtue of the Refugee Act, the court found that Congress had spoken in no un-
certain terms in directing the Attorney General to establish an asylum proce-
dure for aliens within the United States, "irrespective of such alien's status."
130
This enactment, the court observed, underscored U.S. treaty obligations under
the UN Protocol and provided legislative substance to the national commitment
to refugees. 11 While placing heavy emphasis on Marincas v. Lewis, the
Fourth Circuit made no mention of that decision's reliance on due process that
was non-constitutional. Instead, the court in Selgeka cited Marincas, as well as
Augustin v. Sava to support its constitutional due process holding.
132
Because the majority in Selgeka concluded that the congressional mandate
for an asylum procedure required a single, uniform process, the diminished
procedural safeguards for stowaways were found to violate due process. The
dissent did not challenge the alien's right to constitutional due process but dis-
puted the premise that INS procedures for stowaways were inadequate. Ac-
cordingly, in its decision in Selgeka v. Carroll, the generally conservative
Fourth Circuit issued a clear validation of the constitutional right of any alien
on U.S. soil to seek asylum.
IV. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. IIRIRA and the New Concepts ofAdmitted and Unadmitted Aliens
Resolution of this wide variance among circuit courts requires not only
analysis of their rulings, but also of the impact of new immigration legislation
that became effective subsequent to the events underlying those decisions. In
1996, Congress amended the Immigration and Naturalization Act by enacting
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIR1RA").133 The principal substantive features of IIRIRA became effective
on April 1, 1997,134 and thus post-dated the factual circumstances giving rise to
the divergent decisions among the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits, and, potentially, the First Circuit. Significantly, the key provi-
sion for asylum purposes under pre-existing law, Section 1158(a) from the
original Refugee Act, was not altered. Thus, the predicate for statutory entitle-
ment recognized in decisions such as Augustin v. Sava and Selgeka v. Carroll
130. Selgeka, 184 F.3d at 342 (citing 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)).
131. Id. at 342.
132. Id. at 342-45.
133. Pub. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
134. Selgeka, 184 F.3d at 341.
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remains intact.' 35 The long-standing definitions of "excludable" and "deport-
able" aliens, however, were replaced by new statutory terms and concepts. Un-
der IIRIRA, instead of excludable aliens, the statute speaks to "inadmissable"
aliens.136 Inadmissible aliens are those who have not lawfully entered this
country. Broader than the former category of "excludables," inadmissible ali-
ens include not only immigrants detained at a port of entry, but also those who
succeeded in an illegal, surreptitious entry upon U.S. soil. 137 As a result, aliens
denied admission by immigration authorities ("excludables") are now equated
with aliens who illegally gained physical entry ("deportables"), so that both
groups are merged into the new classification of unadmitted aliens. 138 "Ad-
mitted" aliens, on the other hand, are those who were lawfully permitted to
enter the country free from conditions of detention or parole. These immi-
grants would correspond to that component of formerly deportable aliens
whose arrival was permitted by immigration authorities.
The impact of the elimination of the excludable/deportable dichotomy in
favor of the unadmitted/admitted alien demarcation has not been explicitly re-
solved subsequent to the enactment of IIRIRA. In a decision arising since the
1997 effective date of the new law, the district court and Eleventh Circuit in
Gonzalez v. Reno 139 both dispatched the due process claim of six-year-old
Elian with a one sentence reference to the circuit court's opinion in Jean v.
Nelson. 140 Despite its notable brevity, the rejection of due process may still be
important for several reasons. Significantly, in rejecting a child's constitutional
claim, the court relied on Jean v. Nelson rather than any contention that refu-
gee children have a lesser constitutional status than adults. As a result, the
court's approach left unchallenged the impact of Polovchak v. Meese141 and
Johns v. Department of Justice,142 leading circuit court decisions concerning
135. Id. at at 342 ("The linchpin of Selgeka's case is 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)..."); see Augustin v. Sava,
735 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting with reference to the Refugee Act of 1980 that aliens "do have
such statutory rights as Congress grants.").
136. Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 395 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999).
137. Id.
138. 8 U.S.C. §ll01(1 3)(A).
139. 215 F.3d 1243 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
140. 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) approved on non-constitutional grounds, 472 U.S.
846 (1985).
141. 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985). In Polovchak, the court recognized that at age 12, Walter
Polovchak had an independent constitutional right to seek asylum, just as his parents had a constitu-
tional right to intervene in such proceedings to insist that their son be returned to them in the Soviet
Union. Since Walter entered the U.S. legally, however, the case is more significant in its inclusion of
children as well as parents within the reach of due process and does not address the rights of excludable
or illegally entering aliens. The Seventh Circuit continues to confirm a child's right to a hearing. De-
Silva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 1997).
142. 624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980). In Johns, the court found that the Due Process Clause protected
five-year-old Cynthia, a Mexican girl subject to deportation proceedings. Due to the cross-fire between
her Mexican natural mother and the U.S. husband and wife who had brought her illegally into this
country when Cynthia was an infant, the court ordered the appointment of a guardian ad litem. A "de-
portable" under existing law, Cynthia would be an unadmitted alien under today's definitions.
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the rights of immigrant children. 143
Other consequences are more specifically signaled by Gonzalez v. Reno.
For the first time, the Eleventh Circuit's doctrine rejecting due process for ex-
cludable aliens was applied directly to an asserted right to seek asylum, as op-
posed to ancillary issues such as parole, detention, and pre-asylum notification
claims. 144 Second, while not explicitly addressing the impact of the 1996 pas-
sage of IIRIRA, the court's rejection of due process for Elian, an unadmitted
alien, necessarily confirms that the Eleventh Circuit will apply the same con-
stitutional standard to unadmitted aliens that previously encompassed "exclud-
ables."
As courts continue to address the right to asylum in the aftermath of
IIRIRA, the decisions that have validated due process can also be expected to
maintain the same constitutional course. As described earlier, the holdings of
the Second, 145 Third, 146 and Fourth Circuits 147 that sustained rights for "ex-
cludables," addressed asylum-seekers who would constitute unadmitted aliens
under IRIRA. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's original validation of due process
in 1982, like the D.C. Circuit's similar holding in 1989, extended due process
rights for deportable aliens who, having entered illegally, would constitute un-
admitted aliens under the current definitions. Therefore, not only did the analy-
sis of those deportable alien cases evince no reliance upon any traditional dis-
tinctions, the facts of those cases, if transplanted to the current modem
statutory concepts, would similarly endorse due process rights for today's un-
admitted aliens.
Moreover, because the critical asylum provision in the Refugee Act of
1980 remains undiminished by the 1996 amendments to the INA, the predicate
of statutory entitlement that anchored all but one of these decisions maintains
143. Nor did the Eleventh Circuit attempt to distinguish leading Supreme Court decisions that
speak to the rights of minors in other contexts. As the Supreme Court observed in its landmark procla-
mation of children's constitutional fights, "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) ("Those young people do not 'shed their constitutional rights' at the
schoolhouse door."). In another decision underscoring the separately protected rights of children, this
Court said, "A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitu-
tion." Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979). Thus, a child's well-being have long embodied so-
cietal values that the Constitution does not ignore. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ; Jeho-
vah's Witnesses in the State of Washington v. King's County Hospital, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.),
affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); see also Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979) (children being admitted
to mental hospitals by parents have independent constitutional rights). In fact, even more than their par-
ents, illegal alien children deserve enhanced constitutional protection because they are innocents con-
cerning their presence in our country. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
144. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (1 1dh Cir. 1985); Jean v. Nelson, supra.
145. Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984).
146. Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996).
147. Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999).
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the same protectible interest in seeking asylum. 148 Also undiminished is the
reach of the asylum provision to all aliens "physically present" in the United
States, "irrespective of such alien's status." Just as this language sweeps
across any differentiation between "excludables" or "deportables," the asylum
.law should be equally indifferent to distinctions that otherwise apply to unad-
mitted and admitted aliens. Therefore, in examining the due process decisions
in light of the subsequent transition to unadmitted and admitted aliens, the
facts as well as the legal analysis of those cases reflect that their constitutional
outcomes should remain constant.
Accordingly, the enactment of IIRIRA should not revise the existing circuit
alignment which arrays the Second, Fourth, Fifth and D.C. Circuits as propo-
nents of Fifth Amendment due process, the Third Circuit in a middle ground of
non-constitutional due process, while the Eleventh Circuit, perhaps joined by
the First, rejects any such safeguards. With the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of
en banc consideration in Gonzalez v. Reno, the reaffirmation of Jean v. Nelson
by that important immigration law tribunal assures a future of unacceptable di-
vergence concerning the human rights of millions until the constitutional issue
is resolved by the Supreme Court.
148. While Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith cited a federal regulation that predated 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a), the subsequent passage of the Refugee Act provided, if anything, an even more compelling
basis for the Fifth Circuit's due process analysis.
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V. THE FUTURE OF ASYLUM RIGHTS
A. Clarifying Landon v. Plasencia and Applying Modern Due Process
In further constitutional development of the right to seek asylum, the
Court's 1982 opinion in Landon v. Plasencia should not continue to denigrate
the asylum rights under the Fifth Amendment for countless refugees today.
149
As described earlier, Landon v. Plasencia's reference to "privilege" consti-
tuted dictum because the subject of that case was found to have been a lawful
resident alien with undeniable constitutional rights concerning any expulsion
from this country. Moreover, in critical respects, Landon v. Plasencia embod-
ied outdated notions at odds with the prevailing Supreme Court directives for
due process. The older case law relied on labels such as "deportables" and "ex-
cludables" that have now been erased statutorily under IIRIRA. Those words,
in turn, were used to delineate whether "rights" or "privileges" were at stake,
pinning one set of outmoded concepts upon a second set of conceptual an-
tiques.
Neither mode of labeling should overcome modern concepts of basic hu-
man rights. Thus, the deportable/excludable delineation was not only mechani-
cal, it unfairly bestowed greater constitutional rights upon some aliens even
though they were illegal and undocumented. 150 Immigrants who succeeded in
an unlawful, surreptitious landing were rewarded over excludable aliens who,
following an unsuccessful appearance at a port of entry, might remain impris-
oned in INS detention facilities for months or more. 15
Fortunately, with the 1996 statutory elimination of the deport-
able/excludable definitions, the traditional basis for distinguishing between ali-
ens with constitutional rights and those with mere privileges, has been erased.
While arguably the rights and privileges duality could be reattached to the cur-
rent concepts of unadmitted and admitted aliens, modern constitutional analy-
sis discourages any further revival of the older methodology. While the Elev-
enth Circuit established its rule by minimizing asylum with the label of a
"privilege," 152 the premise that individuals forfeit vital safeguards whenever
those safeguards are denominated "privileges" rather than "rights" has largely
149. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984); Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1987).
150. That bifurcation arose from the view that by gaining entry upon U.S. lands, immigrants began
to attach to the local community and therefore were gaining the practical as well as legal attributes of
other residents. Because no easy standard existed for triggering the legal threshold for the development
of such ties, however, aliens were elevated to deportable status simply by reaching land without inter-
ception by the authorities.
151. Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 36 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1984).
152. Jean, 727 F.2d at 968.
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disappeared from our jurisprudence. 153
Thus, the "privileges" language of Landon and Jean represents a largely
abandoned methodology. In discussing the interment of privilege analysis,
Professor Van Alstyne recalled its long-standing and irremediable deficiency:
"Thus Holmes himself readily admitted that to deny that a person had a "right"
to do something was merely to announce the conclusion that a court would not
give him any relief; but the denial itself provides no reason whatsoever why
such relief should be denied."'
' 54
Thus, as modem constitutional philosophies have firmly established, "this
Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether
a government benefit is characterized as a 'right' 55 or as a 'privilege' ...,156
Instead, today the Supreme Court relies on constitutional standards that ex-
amine the nature of the legislatively-created rights, 57 a doctrine launched with
the seminal decision of Goldberg v. Kelly. 158 In that case, the Court found that
because the New York Legislature had created a right to receive welfare bene-
fits, those rights could not be eliminated without complying with due process,
an adherence that required a fair hearing. Other cases such as Mathews v. El-
dridge159 have extended and clarified due process. 16 Finding that a denial of
social security benefits invoked due process safeguards, the Court announced a
three-part test, balancing the private interest and the likelihood of erroneous
deprivation along with the competing interest of the government. 16 1 In another
decision, treating revocation of a convicted felon's discretionary entitlement to
parole, the opinion authored by the late Chief Justice Burger similarly required
a due process hearing: "Nor are we persuaded by the argument that revocation
is so totally a discretionary matter that some form of hearing would be admin-
istratively intolerable. A simple factual hearing will not interfere with the exer-
cise of discretion."'
162
Thus, the Court's due process decisions established that, while legislatures
may elect not to confer a particular liberty or property interest on an individual
153. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §7.3 at 157 (1998
ed.).
154. Williams W. Van Alstyne, The Demise Of The Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1459 (1968). As Justice Holmes acknowledged long ago, "One phrase
adds no more than the other to what we know about it."
155. Id. at 1459.
156. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644
(1973)).
157. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). As this Court noted 28 years ago, "It is hardly
useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether the parolee's liberty is a 'right' or
a 'privilege.' By whatever name, the liberty is valuable." Id. at 482.
158. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
159. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
160. Id. at 334-35.
161. Id. at 334-335.
162. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483.
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once conferred, that interest should not be erased without appropriate safe-
guards. 163 As applied to the right to seek asylum by cases like Selgeka v.
Carroll, this dimension of constitutional recognition is not derived directly
from the Due Process Clause itself, but arises from the separate source of con-
stitutional protection that encompasses legislatively-created enactments.
64
Even apart from the 1982 discussion of near-obsolete labeling for rights
and privileges, however, is the fact that Landon v. Plasencia nowhere ad-
dresses the Refugee Act of 1980, the due process linchpin of ensuing circuit
court holdings. When properly viewed as a declaration of previous law, the
Landon v. Plasencia disclaimer of constitutional rights for aliens seeking ad-
mission is consistent with an era in which no asylum entitlement had been leg-
islated. 165 Since the statutory right to seek asylum postdated the facts under-
lying that decision, the Court's statement in 1982 is no obstacle to holding that
the Refugee Act is a separate predicate for Fifth Amendment protection.
Although Landon v. Plasencia is compatible with a finding that the Refu-
gee Act established a constitutionally protected right to seek asylum, it remains
unanswered so far. As discussed earlier, the Court has never addressed the con-
stitutional impact of the Refugee Act. Meanwhile, the circuit courts addressing
that watershed legislation have understandably treaded carefully around Lan-
don, declining to confront its "privilege" declaration, either as dictum or as a
pronouncement supplanted by later developments. While the Fourth Circuit's
treatment of Landon in Selgeka v. Carroll comes closer than others to pro-
viding a needed clarification, its discussion may be too brief to provide the
level of analysis needed to resolve any lingering concerns about the current
impact of this frequently cited Supreme Court decision.
166
B. Resolving the Due Process Question: The Third Circuit's Middle Ground
In Marincas v. Lewis, the court apparently side-stepped the issue by ac-
knowledging Landon's apparent constitutional subtractions and therefore
predicating due process on statutory and treaty-based analysis. While the non-
constitutional due process findings seemingly navigated a middle course be-
tween the opposing circuit alignments, the Third Circuit's apparently safe pas-
163. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
164. Prisoners' Rights-Punishments Imposed By Administrative Proceedings, 109 HARV. L.
REv. 141 (1995) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 555 U.S. 472, 479 n.4 (1995))
165. Indeed, as decisions like Augustin v. Sava and Selgeka v. Carroll have observed in sustaining
due process based on 8 U.S.C. §1158(a), there is no independent or inherent right to seek asylum under
the Constitution. Thus, their finding that due process must instead be based on a statutory entitlement is
not incompatible with the statements in Landon.
166. In Selgeka, the court cited Landon for the proposition that there are no independent asylum
rights and therefore applied due process upon the theory of a statutory entitlement created by the Refu-
gee Act. Selgeka, 184 F.3d at 342. There was no discussion of whether Landon's much quoted constitu-
tional phrases were dictum or whether its rights/privileges dichotomy remained viable. The Fourth Cir-
cuit also stopped short of explaining that the 1982 court decision nowhere addressed the Refugee Act.
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sage arguably collided with a different set of principles concerning statutory
construction and judicial deference to agency interpretations.
The Third Circuit's middle ground was reached through a judicially active
extrapolation of legislative intent that overrode contrary agency regulations
and practices of the INS. In the modem era of judicial review of administrative
actions, however, the long shadows cast by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,16 7 make such judicial overrides debatable. Indeed,
judicial deference to agencies on statutory questions is the overwhelming real-
ity in most cases, unless statutes are clear and unambiguous.' 68 When statutes
are "silent or ambiguous," on the other hand, agencies like the INS enjoy sig-
nificant latitude to fashion procedures and results within the scope of their ad-
ministrative expertise. Since the Refugee Act of 1980 did not speak directly to
the nature or methods of the asylum tribunal, the various requirements imposed
in Marincas v. Lewis arguably constituted judicial improvements upon zones
of silence or ambiguity that, absent constitutional safeguards, should arguably
have been controlled by INS discretion.
Commendably, the Third Circuit insisted upon fundamentally fair proce-
dures for alien stowaways, an outcome functionally consonant with the con-
stitutional due process holdings, while steering between the divided circuits on
the constitutional issue. 16 9 While averting one source of decisional conflict,
though, the Third Circuit's methodology arguably encounters a different con-
troversy with respect to the measure of judicial deference to agency interpreta-
tions. Accordingly, while the Third Circuit's premise of non-constitutional due
process averted any confrontation with the still resonant dictum of Landon v.
Plasencia, 170 it did not avoid the deep entanglements of agency discretion and
167. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
168. To overcome the heavy hand of Chevron deference in immigration cases, Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292 (1993), the Third Circuit relied on INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), cited at 92
F.3d at 200 for the proposition that "the judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construc-
tion" 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. Arguably, however, the Third Circuit overextended Cardoza-Fonseca be-
cause that decision is normally read to confirm the basic rule that clear expression of legislative intent
will override contrary agency interpretations and is not applied as a disparagement of Chevron defer-
ence. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
169. Although the Fifth and D.C. Circuits did not rely on any distinction between "deportables"
and "excludables," the facts of those cases appeared to encompass deportation proceedings. As a result,
no direct confrontation with the Landon v. Plasencia dictum was required. In Augustin v. Sava, like
Marincas v. Lewis, the court sustained the asylum rights of excludable aliens. The Second Circuit, how-
ever, did not address Landon, while, as discussed, the Third Circuit apparently avoided its constitutional
implications through a statutory premise of due process.
170. More recently, the Third Circuit discussed approvingly the Eleventh Circuit's premise in Jean
that prolonged detention of excludable aliens did not ordinarily implicate constitutional offenses. Chi
Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 393 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit emphasized, though, that even an
excludable alien is a person entitled to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 396
(citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)). As a result, the court held that exclud-
able aliens in detention required an "opportunity for an evaluation of the individual's current threat to
the community and his risk of flight." Id. at 398. The court found that interim rules announced by the
INS for detainees such as Chi Thon Ngo, appeared to satisfy constitutional requisites, if applied mean-
ingfully. On the other hand, "superficial review is not satisfactory and does not offer due process." 192
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presents a close question on the issue of Chevron deference.
71
C. The Majority Circuit View and Constitutional Due Process
When the statutory right to seek asylum is tested against the criteria of
modem Supreme Court holdings, those decisions support the outcome of the
majority of circuit decisions that apply due process.1 72 The starting point is
recognition that by its terms, the Due Process Clause encompasses every per-
son on U.S. soil, a basic reality underscored in Mathews v. Diaz.'7 3 From the
fact that an alien, too, is undeniably a person, the analysis is driven further by
the long-standing premise reiterated in Plyler v. Doe that the Constitution
reaches each person within the sovereign territory of the United States. 74 This
rule has been applied unfailingly and has assured due process protections for
aliens charged with crimes1 75 as well as for foreigners threatened with potential
F.3d at 399. Thus, by clearly extending constitutional due process to excludable aliens in detention, the
Third Circuit's ruling in Chi Thon Ngo, in conjunction with Marincas, further confirms that this court is
aligned more closely with the holdings of the Second, Fifth and D.C. Circuits than with the Eleventh
Circuit position, even if the Third Circuit's analytic framework is not stated in the identical terms.
171. As a statutory decision based on plain meaning and legislative intent, INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 n. 30, represents the foremost Supreme Court impediment to broadening of
INS discretion. See also Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (overruling INS view that a perma-
nent alien's return to the U.S. after a couple of hours departure does not constitute an "entry"). Even in
statutory cases, however, the Court usually defers to the INS. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415
(1999); INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992); INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985); INS v. Baga-
masbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976); INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981);
172. Although not dispositive of the Ninth Circuit's position on asylum issue, in Wang v. Reno, 81
F.3d 808 (9"' Cir. 1996), the court held that an excludable Chinese alien, paroled into the U.S. to assist
as a government witness, was entitled to due process protection from extraordinary prosecutorial mis-
conduct. That decision did not address asylum rights or the Refugee Act but nonetheless supports the
position that even excludable aliens were within the reach of the Due Process Clause. This ruling indi-
cates that the Ninth Circuit may be favorably disposed toward the majority circuit position concerning
asylum.
173. 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265
(1990) (finding that the Fourth Amendment "by contrast with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, extends
its reach only to 'the people"'). Based on such analysis, this Court in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), confirmed that this principle applies to aliens, for "[w]hatever his status under the immigration
laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term." Id. at 210; see also Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). As one court explained, the Constitution necessarily reaches even exclud-
able aliens who are physically within our border, "Surely Congress could not order the killing of Rodri-
guez-Femandez and others in his status." Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10"'
Cir. 1981). As another court explained, because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
tects each "person," its mantle enveloped even an unadmitted alien who faced serious peril if removed
to China. Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 817 (9th Cir. 1996) ("However, as the Verdugo-Urquidez Court
expressly noted, the Fifth Amendment provides protection to the 'person' rather than 'the people'.")
(citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (91h Cir.1988) rev'd 494 U.S. 259 (1990));
see also Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5 h Cir. 1987) (illegal, unadmitted alien, a "person" for
due process purposes and cannot constitutionally be subjected for physical abuse).
174. "These provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial juris-
diction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
175. The right of an unadmitted alien to Fifth Amendment due process protections at trial has
been acknowledged as early as Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) and has been validated
unfailingly by the lower federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 912-913 (5th Cir.
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confiscation of their property. 176 Thus, when the Supreme Court held in Ply-
ler v. Doe 177 that illegal and undocumented immigrant children cannot be de-
nied a public education, it observed that "[w]hatever his status under the immi-
gration laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term,"
and is therefore a "person" guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 178 Therefore, because the Due Process Clause en-
compasses all persons - including immigrants - who are "physically present" in
the U.S., they cannot be constitutionally quarantined beyond the reach of the
Fifth Amendment.
Since aliens are not constitutionally invisible, the statutory entitlements
conferred upon immigrants should be defined by the same due process analysis
that prevails for all other "persons" in this country. Thus, as is already estab-
lished in various circuits, the mantle of due process is extended to the asylum
process by fusing the statutory right to seek asylum with the procedural due
process doctrine of cases such as Goldberg and Zimmerman Brush. This fusion
does not meld entitlements that are inherent in the Constitution but, rather, en-
velopes property and liberty interests with constitutional protection once they
are duly conferred by substantive law. Accordingly, while there is no intrinsic
constitutional duty to provide social security or welfare benefits, 179 when a
government chooses to grant them, due process governs a substantial depriva-
tion of such entitlements. In much the same fashion, the statutory grant of the
right to seek asylum, standing upon decades of evolving U.S. commitments to
international norms concerning refugees, readily satisfies the threshold criteria
for an interest sufficient to invoke the protection of due process. 79
In defining the protected entitlement, courts have long recognized the seri-
ous consequences of being expelled from this country, and therefore, the right
to seek asylum has been characterized as a liberty interest. 180 While courts
1979); United States v. Casimiro-Benitez, 533 F.2d 1121 (9 th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 926
(1976).
176. Even non-resident aliens cannot be subjected to unlawful takings of their property. United
States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 866 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 ( 10 h Cir. 1981). Accordingly, in Russian Volunteer Fleet
v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931), the Supreme Court stated, "[a]s alien friends are embraced within
the terms of the Fifth Amendment, it cannot be said that their property is subject to confiscation here
because the property of our citizens may be confiscated in the alien's country." Id. at 491-492.
177. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
178. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210; see also Wang v. Reno, 81 F.2d 808, 816 (9 th Cir. 1996) (A Chinese
alien paroled into this country to assist as government witness, though apparently an excludable alien
entitled to due process protection from prosecutorial misconduct).
179. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Even in the early 1950's, courts appeared to recognize that procedures enacted by Congress implicated
due process. "It has been held that 'whatever the procedure authorized by Congress, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned."' Han-Lee Mao v. Brownell, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 102, 107, 207
F. 2d 142, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (citing Inauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544, 70 S. Ct. 309, 313,
94 L.Ed. 317 (1950)).
180. As another court expressed the stark realities that confront an alien facing deportation:
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have confirmed that asylum processes are not equatable with criminal pro-
ceedings' 81 in post-World War 1I decisions, the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged solemnly that "Here the liberty of an individual is at stake ..... 182 In
further emphasizing the grave consequences of the alien's removal from this
country, the court has characterized such issues as "basic to human liberty and
happiness, and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be re-
tumed, perhaps to life itself."183 In addition to cognizance as a liberty interest,
the right to bring a claim for asylum may also embody a property interest of
equal or greater dignity to the unemployment benefits claim 184 or individual
claim in a class action 185 that modem Supreme Court decisions have safe-
guarded through due process. 86
Therefore, by applying current doctrine to the right to seek asylum con-
ferred by the 1980 Refugee Act, the safeguards of constitutional due process
should be extended to the asylum seeker. When rights ascend to constitutional
recognition, they reside in the province of the judiciary and cannot be reduced
through the discretion of administrative agencies. 187 Therefore, this issue is
critical, not only to effectuate Congress's desire for a fair and uniform proce-
dure, but also to assure that agency expediencies are not permitted to tran-
scend basic constitutional rights.
188
D. The Impact of Due Process for Asylum Seekers
Any such enlargement of judicial responsibility does not threaten the INS
If he loses, he will be removed from this country - a promised land for many. He may face deprivation,
torture or even death when he is returned to his homeland. He may also lose contact with his family and
friends. Padilla-Augustin v. INS, 21 F.3d 970, 978 (9"h Cir. 1994) (later overruled on other grounds); see
also Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1369 n. 11 (9"h Cir. 1993) ("Deportation is a drastic measure
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.").
181. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) ("various protections that apply in the
context of a civil trial do not apply in a deportation hearing"), Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 275 U.S. App.
D.C. 109, 114, 865 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
182. Haitian Refigee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038 (5" Cir. 1982) (citing Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (deportation visits a great hardship on the individual and "deprives
him of his right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.")).
183. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950). As one circuit court expressed this
reality, while deportation is not a criminal action, "the consequences may more seriously affect the de-
portee than a jail sentence." Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522, 524 (5"h Cir. 1980) ("liberty
of the individual is at stake."). As one court described the equation, "deportation is a drastic measure
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile." Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1369 n.1 1(9th
Cir. 1993).
184. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (right to use state adjudicatory proce-
dures a property interest for due process purposes).
185. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
186. Clearly, this Court has found claims of lesser magnitude than asylum to constitute property
interests protected by due process. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478,
483 (1988); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306.
187. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977).
188 Id.
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with unmanageable new burdens. Thus, while extending due process to asylum
seekers, circuit court decisions have not overwhelmed the INS by imposing a
vast revision of existing procedures. Instead, the due process decisions have
insisted on a minimum of procedural fairness, often borrowing safeguards al-
ready provided by the INS in one asylum context to assure fairness in others.
Thus, the features that due process requires typically would begin with the
right to an adversarial hearing before a neutral fact-finder in which the appli-
cant may, among other things, present witnesses and other evidence to sub-
stantiate the asylum claim. 189 Consistently with Supreme Court rulings, the re-
quirement of "some form of hearing,"'190 conducted "at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner,"' 191 is integral to any adjudication secured by due pro-
192
cess.
Circuit court decisions have further mandated that adequate translation
services be provided, obviously a critical need for most aliens to be able to
comprehend and participate effectively in the asylum process.' 93 To assure a
record to afford meaningful subsequent review, hearing transcripts have been
required. 194 Additionally, one court found that asylum applicants must be noti-
fied of their right to counsel, the availability of free legal representation and
the right to a public hearing, as well as the opportunity to examine and object
to adverse evidence, to compel testimony of witnesses by subpoena and to ob-
tain subsequent review of the asylum hearing. 195 These procedures are neither
unduly burdensome nor unreasonable. Indeed, because asylum seekers are in-
dividuals who face an adjudication with "grave and potentially irreversible
consequences,"196 such safeguards represent a minimum foundation for basic
fairness and decency.
E. The Necessity for Judicial Definition of Human Rights
No court has attempted to catalogue all the features that due process might
require in the asylum process, nor could it. 197 The strictures of due process
necessarily vary with the circumstances. 198 But the proper constitutional in-
quiry must concern the scope of the constitutional rights at stake, not whether
189. Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999); Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cit.
1996).
190. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
191. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
192. The alien's right to be heard has long been recognized in deportation settings. Yamataya v.
Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) ("[N]o person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity ... to
be heard .... ).
193. Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984); Marincas, 92 F.3d at 203.
194. Marincas, 92 F.3d at 203.
195. Id.
196. Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731,737 n. 10 (7
h Cir. 1985).
197. Augustin, 735 F.2d at 37; Marincas, F.3d at 203.
198. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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the Due Process Clause can be invoked at all. 199 Clearly, the dramatic conse-
quences of removal from this country compel a corresponding need to maintain
realistic and effective assurances that the process is fair, consistent and neu-
trally determined. Thus, because he was safeguarded by the Constitution, a
refugee-seeker from Kosovo, like Selgeka, could not be expelled through a
short form process, which he barely understood, without access to an impartial
forum. Similarly, stripped of any deference that might insulate INS procedures
in non-constitutional settings, the token fifteen minute hearings at issue in
Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith could not escape firm judicial action to im-
pose badly needed constitutional safeguards.
Conversely, where due process was not applied, in the high-profile, contro-
versial case of Elian Gonzalez, the INS was able to deny any form of asylum
hearing, reverse fields concerning his status200 and ultimately ignore its own
official criteria announced the year before with respect to asylum claims for
young children. Indeed, as the court had initially discussed in granting an in-
junction pending appeal, the INS Guidelines For Children's Asylum Claims
envisioned that young children, even a six-year-old, "will be active and inde-
pendent participants in the asylum adjudicative process." 2° 1 Even so, the court
concluded in its final opinion that the INS, in its discretion, had the authority to
reject the claim of Elian's independent asylum rights based on Chevron defer-
ence.20 2 While, at various points, the court suggested possible doubts about the
199. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (illegal alien children are innocent of parental
transgressions and deserve constitutional protection), with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(criminals have constitutional right to a hearing before parole can be revoked).
200. The INS's vacillating positioning was highlighted by its December 1, 1999 announcement
that Elian would remain in the U.S. pending state family proceedings, followed a month later by the
decision that state court proceedings were irrelevant and he should be returned to communist Cuba.
201. Order dated April 19, 2000, ("Injunction Order") Gonzalez v. Reno, later opinion at 215 F.3d
1243 (1 1" Cir. 2000). Emphasizing the INS's own guidelines, announced on the 50a' anniversary of the
Declaration of Human Rights on December 14, 1999, the INS criteria made it clear that, "asylum offi-
cers should not assume that a child cannot have an asylum claim independent of the parents." Injunc-
tion Order at 11 n.12. The court further pointed to circumstances in which the guidelines proposed
methodologies for resolving parent and child conflict, "when... it appears that the will of the parents and
that of the child are in conflict, the adjudicator 'will have to come to a decision as to the well founded-
ness of the minor's fear on the basis of all the known circumstances, which may call for a liberal appli-
cation of the benefit of the doubt."' Id. (See Guidelines at 20 (citations omitted). The court even noted
that, "the training guidelines provide an example of a statement from a six year old child and provide
information which can be used to assess statements by children of that age." Id. Notwithstanding the
overwhelming evidence of support in the INS's own guidelines for a child's independent asylum claim,
the Eleventh Circuit final opinion discarded those guidelines stating that they did not have the force of
law.
202. Gonzalez, 215 F.3d at 1244-1245. Arguably, the Eleventh Circuit accorded excessive defer-
ence to the INS action that constituted a litigation position. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,
488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) ("Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient
litigation position would be entirely inappropriate."); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
447 n. 30 (1987). While the Supreme Court's decision in Christensen v. Harris Co., 120 S.Ct. 1655
(2000) appeared to cast doubt on according deference to agency views "contained in an opinion letter,"
120 S.Ct. at 1662, both the en banc court and the Supreme Court declined to disturb the panel ruling. As
a result, the measure of agency discretion accorded in Gonzalez v. Reno may constitute a further en-
largement of already accelerating agency power.
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correctness of the INS's statutory interpretation, it nonetheless concluded that
it was obliged under Chevron to accept the INS's application of the law, 20 3 a
deference trumpeted throughout the court's opinion.
By allowing the INS to ignore its own announced guidelines, the Eleventh
Circuit may have expanded agency latitude exceeding even the broad discre-
tion awarded in Jean v. Nelson.204 Whether the rationale for such extraordinary
deference is the NS's role in foreign policy or the realities of its complex and
chronically unmanageable burdens, the result is striking. Manifestly, in the ab-
sence of constitutional safeguards, the INS is free to revise and reduce the cal-
culus of the most basic human rights, even for a child.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the definition of the rights of the individual is more properly re-
posed in our judiciary, the courts should accept the constitutional duty to safe-
guard the fundamental rights for millions of immigrant men, women and chil-
dren who walk upon our lands. That duty transcends any debate over the
societal impact of immigration20 5 a controversy that has endured since our na-
206tion was founded. The enormous, perhaps still expanding discretion of the
NS wherever the Constitution is silenced, may deprecate refugees as non-
persons in legal and moral terms. While such may be the fabric of many coun-
tries from which refugees flee, it should never be a principle acceptable to the
American people. The troubling turnover of human rights to the INS may per-
haps be understandable in the context of history and the current milieu of in-
203. Id. at 1245.
204. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 956 (11 th Cir. 1984), had sustained claims based, in part, upon the
INS's obligation to apply its own announced guidelines, id. at 976-978, and found that enforcing "the
announced policies" of agencies are among the appropriate judicial functions, id. at 984. In Gonzalez v.
Reno the court summarily disposed of the issue by saying that such criteria have no force of law.
205. Another source, the Federation for American Immigration Reform contends that, even after
allowing for immigrants' contributions in taxes, the net cost of legal and illegal immigrants arriving
during the last three decades is the annual expense of $65 billion ($40.5 billion from legal and $24.5
billion from illegal aliens). This yearly cost is assertedly going to rise to $108 billion by 2006. That
same organization has also issued reports contending that immigrants are displacing native-born work-
ers attributing a fifty percent of the wage-loss among low-skilled Americans to low-skilled immigrant
workers. "Immigration Lower Wages for American Workers," Issue Brief, The Federation For Ameri-
can Immigration Reform, (http://www.fairus.org/html/0414871 l.htm).
In another analysis, the author concluded that the increased number of workers resulting from immi-
gration costs native workers roughly $135 billion annually (1.9 percent of a $7 trillion economy) but
creates a net gain due to the benefits accruing to employers. Those savings range from large agricultural
enterprises to households who might otherwise be unable to afford domestic help. "The New Econom-
ics of Immigration," The Atlantic Monthly (Nov. 1996).
(http://www.theatlantic.com/isues/96nov/immigratborjas/htm). The author's conclusion is that the more
affluent gain from the influx of alien workers while lower income Americans are correspondingly pe-
nalized.
206. As recognized by one author, "Now that the arguments against immigration are rising again,
it is well remembered that every single one of them has been heard before." Weisberger supra note 1, at
75.
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 19:303, 2001
tractable numbers and challenges. No such abdication, however, can be faithful
to the traditions of a country that has always entrusted basic liberties to the
federal judiciary: "In sum, our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fun-
damental principal - that the 'judicial power of the United States' must be re-
posed in an independent Judiciary. It commands that the independence of the
Judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections
for that independence." 20 7 Therefore, especially in light of the current breadth
of Chevron deference, constitutional recognition of asylum rights is imperative
to maintain the judiciary's "function as a check on any aggrandizing tenden-
cies in the other branches." 208 Through constitutional recognition, human rights
are not reduced by deference doctrines. Instead, the vindication of liberties un-
der the Constitution is entrusted not to bureaucrats, but to judges, the only ac-
ceptable guardians with so much at stake. 20 9 Like the world community, the
federal courts have repeatedly acknowledged the enormity of the conse-
quences of removal from this country. As one court observed, "the conse-
quences of deportation may more seriously affect the deportee than a jail sen-
tence., 210 Indeed, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court observed
2 11
"Deportation is always a harsh measure. It is all the more replete with danger
when the alien makes a claim that he or she will be subject to death or perse-
cution if forced to return to his or her home country." 212
While due process validation of asylum rights for all aliens on U.S. soil
may have further constitutional ramifications 2 13 the inevitability of other due
207. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Construction Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60
(1982).
208. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985). Indeed as has
been recognized, further augmentation of agency power comes at the expense of access to the judicial
forum. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46-47 (1932).
209. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977). Such acknowledgment is also critical in as-
suring that deprivation of individual rights can be judicially reviewed. McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991).
210. Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522, 524 (5"h Cir. 1980). As the Supreme Court it-
self has stated in examining the impact of expulsion from this country, it visits "a great hardship on the
individual and deprives him of his right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom." Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
211. 480 U.S. 421,449 (1987).
212. Id.
213. It is beyond the scope of this article to assess whether due process rights concerning a statu-
tory mandate for asylum would implicate constitutional protection in the parole and detention scenarios.
Compare Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1483-84 (11th Cir. 1985), with Rodriguez-Fernandes v.
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying due process to assess the permissible limits of in-
definite detention). Undoubtedly, though, the recognition that "unadmitted" aliens have due process
rights concerning asylum could affect other immigration issues. Among the INS's procedures that con-
stitutional due process could confront the expedited removal procedures enacted in 1996 as part of
IIRIRA. Such procedures have been criticized by the Human Rights Watch:
Implementation of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) continued to violate interna-
tional human rights standards that apply specifically to asylum seekers, as well as the human
rights of other immigrants, through detention in often inhumane conditions. The IIRIRA's ex-
pedited removal proceedings, intended to process and deport individuals who enter the United
The Due Process Right To Seek Asylum
process questions should not detain further the compelling case for constitu-
tional recognition of asylum. Moreover, the truth is that constitutional ac-
knowledgment of all aliens on our soil will not impair border security meas-
214ures such as the interdiction of aliens on the high seas, since those passages
are simply not lodged within the constitutional enclosures of U.S. territory.
215
Nor is there any great difficulty in applying the appropriate standard for due
process. Since the Supreme Court has firmly embraced a three-part test for de-
fining the minimum safeguards in other constitutional provinces, extending
that analysis to all immigrants within our nation will enhance, rather than re-
duce, the consistency of constitutional doctrine.216
Accordingly, whatever may be the trepidations of implicating itself further
in the human, moral and legal morass of immigration, the courts should stand
firm to that responsibility. Rather than surrender the definition of human rights
to the INS, the judiciary should honor its traditions of protecting the constitu-
tional rights of all human beings who stand on U.S. soil. 217 As our nation's
history reflects, the ebbs and flows of immigration tides, as well as the accom-
panying emotion and controversy, will continue to buffet public sentiment and
political decision makers. The one constant, however, since the creation of our
Constitution, has been the independent federal judiciary. That sentinel must
continue to assure that no controversy or temporal attitude stands taller than
the great haven of the United States Constitution.
States without valid documents as quickly as possible, imperiled bona fide refugees, and re-
sulted in immigrants being detained in increasing numbers.
Human Rights Report, at 7-8.
214. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Cuban American Bar Association,
Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1424 ( 11th Cir. 1995).
215. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
216. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). The Court has not found constitutional
due process to be unduly burdensome or complicated entitlement in other alienage cases. In Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 602-03 (1953), the Court deemed it sufficient, for purposes of deporta-
tion confronting a lawful permanent resident, to direct that the subject be given "reasonable notice of the
charges against him" and a "hearing sufficient to meet the requirements of procedural due process." In
Wong Yong Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50, (1950). In its general formulation, the Court has ob-
served, "We have described 'the root requirement' of the Due Process Clause as being 'that an individ-
ual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest."
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
217. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("These provisions are universal in their ap-
plication, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, or
color, or of nationality .... ).

